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When Stakeholder Representation Leads to Faultlines. A Study of Board 
Service Performance in Social Enterprises 
 
ABSTRACT   
Following the growing interest in sustainability and ethics, organizations are increasingly 
attentive to accountability toward stakeholders. Stakeholder representation, obtained by 
appointing board members representing different stakeholder groups, is suggested to be a 
good ethical practice. However, such representation may also have nefarious implications for 
board functioning. Particularly, it may result in strong faultline emergence, subsequently 
mitigating board performance. Our study aims at understanding the process through which 
faultlines affect board performance, and particularly the board service role through which the 
board is involved in providing counsel and strategic decision-making. We study the 
relationship between faultlines and board service performance in the particularly relevant 
context of social enterprises. We find that faultline strength is negatively related to board 
service performance and that this relationship is mediated by board task conflict. Furthermore, 
our study reveals the importance of clear and shared organizational goals in attenuating the 
negative effects of faultlines.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate citizenship, sustainability and ethics in organizational contexts are increasingly 
receiving notice (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), thus bringing increased attention to 
accountability toward different stakeholders and the social responsibility of organizations 
(Carroll, 2015), as well as giving rise to an active discussion about stakeholder democracy 
(Matten and Crane, 2005; Van Buren III, 2010). Stakeholder democracy refers to “stakeholder 
participation in processes of organizing, decision-making, and governance in corporations” 
(Matten and Crane, 2005, p. 6). It is considered a best ethical practice or even an ethical 
obligation (Hendry, 2001; Moriarty, 2014; O'Dwyer, 2005): Van Buren III (2010) argues that, 
as stakeholders contribute to the value creation of organizations, they should also have the 
right to participate in the decision-making and corporate governance processes. Through 
stakeholder participation, stakeholders are not just considered as a means, but are also an end, 
in and of themselves (Evan and Freeman, 1993; Hielscher et al., 2014). As taking into 
consideration stakeholder demands is considered crucial for organizational health (Moriarty, 
2014), stakeholder participation is expected to ultimately benefit both society and 
organizations (Harrison and Freeman, 2004). 
However, despite the centrality of stakeholder democracy in ethical discussions, the literature 
devotes considerable attention to the participation of only one particular stakeholder group, 
namely employees (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; Matten and Crane, 2005; Moriarty, 2010), 
referred to as workplace democracy (Matten and Crane, 2005; Timming, 2015). 
Notwithstanding this empirical emphasis on the employees as stakeholders, the board of 
directors, as the ultimate decision-making body in organizations, is considered to play a 
crucial role in effectuating stakeholder participation (Moriarty, 2010; Van Buren III, 2010). 
Indeed, it is commonly accepted that one of the best ways to provide a diverse range of 
stakeholders with greater voice is through appointments to the board of directors (Harrison 
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and Freeman, 2004; Moriarty, 2014). Researchers allude to the potentially positive aspects of 
stakeholder democracy through board appointments (hereafter: stakeholder representation). 
Specifically, it is considered a best practice from an ethical perspective as it enables the 
organization to share power with all stakeholders (Moriarty, 2014; Van Buren III, 2010). 
Furthermore, stakeholder representation may often help in gaining legitimacy from different 
stakeholder groups, which is crucial for the acquisition of resources, including financial and 
human resources (Doherty et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012). By contrast, other researchers 
allude to the potentially nefarious effects of stakeholder representation on the board, which is 
related to slower decision-making and the lack of knowledge of stakeholder representatives 
(Harrison and Freeman, 2004; Hielscher et al., 2014; Matten and Crane, 2005). Consequently, 
it is likely for stakeholder representation to affect board functioning. Boards typically engage 
in two different roles, referred to as the control role (Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012) and the 
service role (Fiegener, 2005; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  It is 
through the service role that the board is involved in enhancing the firm’s reputation, 
establishing contacts with the external environment, as well as giving counsel and advice to 
executives (Minichilli et al., 2009; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). As such, it is likely for 
stakeholder representation to particularly affect the engagement of the board in its service 
role. Surprisingly, however, there is a dearth of research into the implications of stakeholder 
representation on boards of directors in general and, specifically, the board’s service role.  
Our study focuses on understanding the link between stakeholder representation and the 
engagement of the board in its service role (hereafter referred to as “board service 
performance;” similar terms used in the literature include “board service task performance” 
(Minichilli et al., 2009), “board engagement in the service role” (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 
2013), and “board service involvement” (Knockaert et al., 2015). In doing so, we focus on a 
relevant organizational behavior concept and related theories, namely faultlines. A faultline 
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perspective is particularly relevant as stakeholder representation is suggested to lead to the 
formation of subgroups (Pache and Santos, 2010; Smith et al., 2013). Organizational behavior 
scholars point to the importance of studying the behavior of subgroups and suggest focusing 
on faultline emergence as an important mechanism (Bezrukova et al., 2012; Thatcher and 
Patel, 2012). Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines splitting a group into relatively 
homogeneous subgroups, based on the alignment of individuals along multiple characteristics, 
possibly leading to conflicts (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). However, our knowledge on either 
the relationship between stakeholder representation and faultlines, or the relationship between 
board faultlines and the subsequent board and organizational performance (Almandoz, 2012) 
is still limited. Our study aims at investigating the practice of stakeholder representation on 
the board, thereby focusing on board service performance and the extent to which stakeholder 
representation may affect such performance through the emergence of faultlines.  
In aiming for its research objectives, our study considers a particularly relevant context, 
namely that of social enterprises, which engage in commercial activities to solve social 
problems and, as such, have a dual mission of financial sustainability and social goal 
achievement (Battilana et al., 2015; Doherty et al., 2014). First, from a stakeholder 
perspective, social enterprises are particularly relevant as they lack a dominant external 
stakeholder and are exposed to the conflicting expectations and demands of different principal 
stakeholder groups (Ebrahim and Rangan, 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Ramus and Vaccaro, 
2014). To address such conflicting demands, social enterprises often have multi-stakeholder 
boards (Kerlin, 2006; Spear et al., 2009). 
Second, any entrepreneurial firm faces challenges that make a board service role perspective 
particularly relevant (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Minichilli 
et al., 2009). However, in addition to general entrepreneurial challenges, social enterprises 
face specific external and internal tensions (Battilana and Lee, 2014). External tensions are 
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related to the need to establish legitimacy and obtain support from different stakeholder 
groups. Internal tensions are related to balancing the social and economic goals while 
avoiding mission drift; for instance when making decisions on resource allocation (Ashforth 
and Reingen, 2014). As such, through engaging in the service role, boards may be particularly 
important in helping social enterprises deal with these external and internal tensions (Battilana 
and Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Spear et al., 
2009). Consequently, while boards of directors in social enterprises are largely neglected in 
academic research (Spear et al., 2009), they are of utmost importance as they set the overall 
framework within which these organizations operate and make critical decisions (Battilana 
and Lee, 2014; Mair et al., 2015), thus affecting organizational effectiveness (Ostrower and 
Stone, 2006).  
 
Accordingly, this paper aims at unraveling the implications of stakeholder representation on 
boards of organizations. We specifically study the relationship between faultlines originating 
from stakeholder representation and the engagement of the board in its service role. By 
subsequently unraveling the mechanisms and contingencies through which faultlines are 
related to such performance, we aim at contributing to the business ethics, (social) 
entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and organizational behavior literatures in a number 
of ways.  
First, we add to the literature on stakeholder democracy and stakeholder participation by 
leaving the beaten paths of workplace democracy to focus on stakeholder representation as a 
largely neglected aspect source of stakeholder democracy. Specifically, we introduce faultline 
emergence as a potentially nefarious consequence of stakeholder representation in corporate 
governance mechanisms in organizations in general. This paper also explicitly responds to 
calls to focus on the governance function in social enterprises (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Mair 
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et al., 2015) and to specifically study stakeholder representation and subgroup formation in 
order to better understand the relationship between corporate governance practices and board 
performance in social enterprises (Almandoz, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2010). This research further contributes to the extensive body of entrepreneurship literature 
that considers top management and boards as groups of individuals, or teams, and that is 
pointing to faultlines as a promising theoretical avenue (Lim et al., 2013), but is yet to 
incorporate the concept either theoretically or empirically. 
Second, we respond to calls in the corporate governance literature to open up the black box of 
board dynamics (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011; Van Ees et al., 2009). Specifically, 
Ostrower and Stone (2010) call for studies into a wider range of board member characteristics 
than just demographics such as race and gender. Further, as Westphal and Zajac (2013) and 
Knockaert and Ucbasaran (2013) highlight, while much of the corporate governance literature 
takes an agency theoretical perspective in studying the (control) role of the board, other 
(behavioral) theoretical perspectives may be more relevant when studying the service role of 
the board. Importantly, we respond to a call by Cornforth (2012), who argues that corporate 
governance research is often focused on boards in unitary organizations and calls for studies 
into the governance of organizations with more complex governance structures, such as social 
enterprises.  
Finally, we add to the organizational behavior literature, which introduced and widely studies 
faultlines. So far, however, faultline research mainly focuses on age, gender and ethnicity as 
social category characteristics that may give rise to faultline emergence (Thatcher and Patel, 
2012). We add to this literature by introducing stakeholder representation as a potentially 
important social category characteristic (Van der Brempt et al., 2015).  
The paper unfolds along the following lines. First, we systematically develop a number of 
hypotheses on the relationship between faultlines and the board’s service role. We integrate 
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these hypotheses in a theoretical framework that is geared toward a better understanding of 
the relationship between stakeholder representation at board level and board service 
performance, just as the intermediate mechanisms in the relationship. In a following section, 
we describe the research method, including the research setting, the description of the sample, 
data collection and operationalization of the variables. After presenting our results, we discuss 
the main conclusions and contributions of our paper, as well as the limitations and directions 
for future research. 
 
A FAULTLINE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
As articulated above, the representation of different stakeholder groups is often considered to 
be a good practice in balancing the competing demands of stakeholders in the decision-
making process (Moriarty, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010). At the same time, several authors 
warn of the potentially negative effects of stakeholder representation (Pache and Santos, 
2010). Specifically, stakeholder representation may contribute to subgroup emergence. 
Tensions between different subgroups on the board can make it difficult to achieve a clear 
purpose, as such slowing down the decision-making process (Huybrechts, 2010; Spear et al., 
2009). Pache and Santos (2010, p. 468) even warn for ‘dramatic outcomes’. Specifically, 
escalations of conflict may result in organizational paralysis or even permanent organizational 
breakups. However, the literature offers little explanation of the conditions under which the 
emergence of subgroups may negatively influence board performance (Almandoz, 2014). A 
possible explanation can be found in faultline theory, studying the emergence of subgroups 
and its effect on group dynamics and performance. While faultlines may originate from social 
category, informational and personality differences (Thatcher and Patel, 2012), we introduce 
the representation of different stakeholder groups in the board of directors as an additional 
social category characteristic triggering faultline emergence. 
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In what follows, we build upon faultline theory and literature, linking faultlines to board 
service performance. Then, we add a conflict theoretical perspective to explain the process 
through which faultline strength may affect board service performance. Finally, we explore 
which contingency factors could affect the earlier hypothesized relationships. The framework 
we present is summarized in Figure 1 and serves as a guide throughout the remainder of this 
section. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
The origin and nature of faultlines  
The faultline concept has its origin in research on group diversity and heterogeneity. Although 
group members’ traits are important for the way they address issues, it is the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of these traits among group members that affects how they cooperate (Tuggle et 
al., 2010). Research on group diversity reveals that diversity may have positive as well as 
negative effects on group performance (van Knippenberg et al., 2011). Indeed, diversity in a 
group can be a source of knowledge, information and expertise, leading to improved 
performance. This argument is in line with the earlier mentioned positive effects of 
stakeholder representation in groups, or boards of directors specifically (Diochon, 2010; 
Smith, 2010). On the other hand, diversity is also a potential source of conflict, engendering 
subgroups that may disrupt group processes and, consequently, group performance. Similarly, 
stakeholder representation, or diversity in the stakeholder groups represented in the board, 
may lead to negative effects (Pache and Santos, 2010; Spear et al., 2009). Harrison and Klein 
(2007) refer to these effects of group diversity as ‘diversity as variety’ versus ‘diversity as 
separation’. Whereas the first refers to group members bringing a multiplicity of perspectives 
and experiences, the latter points to these members holding different positions or opinions on 
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task-or team-related issues. By consequence, whereas variety enhances creativity and decision 
quality, separation typically reduces cohesiveness and subsequent task performance (Harrison 
and Klein, 2007). 
Following the mixed findings on the effects of group heterogeneity, calls have been made to 
introduce more sophisticated models of diversity that are superior in predicting the negative or 
positive effects of diversity (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Tuggle et al., 2010; van Knippenberg 
et al., 2011). The introduction of the faultline concept by Lau and Murnighan (1998) can be 
considered as a fruitful avenue to answer these calls. Group faultlines are defined as 
hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into subgroups based on alignment along 
multiple attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998). In the faultlines 
reasoning, different dimensions of diversity are studied in conjunction instead of looking at 
different traits separately (Rico et al., 2007). The theoretical mechanisms used to explain the 
emergence and the effects of faultlines are self-categorization, social identification, and 
similarity attraction (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Self-categorization and social identity 
theories explain how individuals, in order to define their identities and to protect their self-
esteem, classify themselves and others into social categories. As a result of such 
categorization, individuals favor and trust their group members more than individuals of other 
groups (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Rico et al., 2007). The similarity-attraction paradigm 
refers to the tendency of people to like, trust and cooperate with similar others (Li and 
Hambrick, 2005; van Knippenberg et al., 2011).  
Although it is generally accepted that faultlines can form around many characteristics (Lau 
and Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher and Patel, 2012), the majority of faultline research focuses on 
faultlines based on demographic social category characteristics, i.e. the characteristics of age, 
gender and ethnicity. In addition, informational or task-related characteristics are studied in 
faultline research (Rico et al., 2007; Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Informational characteristics 
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are underlying attributes that are directly job-related, such as functional background, tenure, 
and education (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Rico et al., 2007). While less frequently studied 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012), personality traits and values are also considered a potential source 
of faultline emergence. Conscientiousness and emotional stability are examples of personality 
traits that are examined in faultline research (Molleman, 2005; Rico et al., 2007). In the 
context of faultlines in boards, board tenure, education level, functional background, industry 
background and type of directorship (executive versus non-executive directors) (Kaczmarek 
et al., 2012; Tuggle et al., 2010), in addition to general demographic characteristics like age 
and gender (Veltrop et al., 2015), are studied. So far, research neglects faultlines originating 
from the representation of different stakeholder groups as one of the driving characteristics. In 
what follows, we elaborate on how strong faultlines in the board, to which stakeholder 
representation contributes, may affect board service performance, and then subsequently 
elaborate on potential mediator and moderator relationships.  
 
The relationship between faultline strength and board service performance 
It is generally accepted that faultlines are particularly detrimental to the organization if they 
are strong. Faultline strength increases when subgroups are homogeneous as subgroup 
members are then more similar, while more strongly differing from members of others 
subgroups with whom they do not share attributes (Lim et al., 2013). Indeed, following 
faultline theory, strong faultlines will result in reduced information exchange and increased 
problems in providing constructive advice, which in turn has a negative impact on joint 
decision-making and the ability to reach a strategic consensus (Li and Hambrick, 2005; 
Minichilli et al., 2009). Generally, strong competition between the subgroups results in less 
time and energy spent on essential tasks, thus distracting from the organizational goals 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012). 
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Based on social identity theory and similarity attraction, we introduce stakeholder 
representation as an additional relevant social category characteristic in faultline research. 
Indeed, board members will quickly identify which stakeholder groups other board members 
represent. Based upon faultline theory, we argue that faultlines will emerge following the 
alignment of stakeholder representation with other important social category characteristics, 
such as age and gender. We argue that, if strong faultlines exist based on the alignment of 
these social category characteristics, board members form identity-based subgroups. In the 
case of stronger faultlines, polarization between board members may occur (Fiol et al., 2009), 
resulting in communication hindrances and decrease in focus on the organization’s goals, 
consequently resulting in decreased board service performance. This is in line with research 
that studies other origins of faultline emergence in other contexts, but that has consistently 
linked faultline strength to negative outcomes (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Indeed, faultline 
strength is linked to diminished performance outcomes, such as decision-making and group 
performance (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Rico et al., 2007).  Subsequently, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Faultline strength is negatively related to board service performance. 
 
Board task conflict as a mediator between faultline strength and board service 
performance 
While we expect to find a negative relationship between faultline strength and board service 
performance, in what follows we argue that faultline strength also indirectly affects board 
service performance through board task conflict.  
First, in line with faultline theory, faultline strength can be expected to positively relate to 
board task conflict. Task conflict refers to differences in viewpoints and opinions about the 
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content of the task (de Wit et al., 2012; Jehn, 1995).  Examples of task conflict are conflicts 
about the distribution of resources, procedures, and policies (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). 
We argue that the representation of different stakeholder groups, strengthened by other social 
category characteristics, on the board will result in different points of view regarding what the 
tasks of the board are and how these tasks are to be fulfilled. Ashforth and Reingen (2014) 
discuss battles between subgroups and the continuing conflicts in the governance process 
when decisions must be made, for instance, on the allocation of resources. Therefore, we 
argue that faultline strength will be positively related to board task conflict, which is in line 
with studies in other contexts and studying other types of faultline origin, but which have 
consistently linked faultlines to task conflict (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 
2005). 
Second, building on conflict theory, we argue that higher levels of board task conflict are 
related to decreased board service performance. While the effect of task conflict on group 
performance is widely studied, the results are inconclusive. For instance, four meta-analyses 
on the effects of task conflict reveal different results. De Dreu and Weingart (2003) and 
O'Neill et al. (2013) find that task conflict has a negative effect on group performance, where 
de Wit et al. (2012) conclude that task conflict is unrelated to such performance. Finally, 
DeChurch et al. (2013) find that task conflict is positively related to group performance. We 
build on the argument of De Dreu (2008), which is particularly relevant for our context, to 
explain why we expect a negative relationship between board task conflict and board service 
performance. De Dreu (2008) argues that in groups where members have vested interests, task 
conflict will negatively influence performance. In the same vein, Loughry and Amason (2014) 
refer to incompatible goals as a possible boundary condition, which can result in lower group 
performance because of ‘political activity’, such as competing for resources. As we argue that 
task conflict in the boards emerges from faultlines originating from the representation of 
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different stakeholder groups, we expect that board members indeed have vested interests and 
that they will most likely demonstrate political behavior in order to defend the stakeholders 
they represent. Political activity, such as competing for resources, is detrimental to group 
performance (De Clercq et al., 2009) as it distracts group members from focusing on the 
essential tasks and overall goals of the organization (Loughry and Amason, 2014). As such, 
vested interests and political behavior hinder constructive debate and joint decision-making 
(De Dreu, 2008). This is further in line with findings in the corporate governance literature, 
negatively linking board task conflict to engagement by the board in advice (Minichilli et al., 
2012) and strategic activities (van Ees et al., 2008). Consequently, we offer the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H2: Board task conflict mediates the relationship between faultline strength and board 
service performance. Specifically, stronger faultlines are related to higher levels of board 
task conflict (H2a), in turn negatively related to board service performance (H2b). 
 
Shared organizational goals and subgroup imbalance as moderating factors 
While initial research on faultlines aimed at understanding the impact of faultlines, newer 
research focuses on understanding contingencies mitigating the negative effects of faultlines 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012). In what follows, we address the two sides of the mediation 
relationship, hereby building on faultlines literature and conflict theory. Specifically, we 
argue that the level of shared organizational goals will moderate the first part of the mediation 
in hypothesis 2, whereas subgroup imbalance will moderate the second part of the mediation .  
First, we argue that the identification as one group instead of a categorization in subgroups is 
a key alleviator of the negative impact of faultlines. Specifically, conflict theory indicates 
that, by introducing ‘integrative forces’, such as an overarching vision, the conflicts that may 
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arise through subgroup formation can be weakened (Collewaert and Sapienza, 2014; de Wit et 
al., 2012; Horton et al., 2014). Similarly, Almandoz (2012) and Pache and Santos (2010) 
indicate that the identification of common goals in the board of directors will make conflict 
less fierce. This is in line with the faultline literature, where the existence of clear and shared 
objectives is found to attenuate the negative effects of strong faultlines (van Knippenberg et 
al., 2011). As such, while stronger faultlines can be expected to lead to higher levels of board 
task conflict, this effect is likely to be mitigated by higher levels of shared organizational 
goals. Therefore, we propose that higher levels of ‘shared organizational goals’ among the 
board members will weaken the positive relationship between faultlines and board task 
conflict, resulting in the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Higher levels of shared organizational goals recognized by board members moderates 
the relationship between faultline strength and board task conflict. Specifically, the positive 
relationship between faultline strength and board task conflict is mitigated by higher levels of 
shared organizational goals, and strengthened by lower levels of shared organizational goals.  
 
Second, we argue that the extent to which task conflict leads to decreased performance will be 
contingent on the relative size of the subgroups. There is a growing interest into how 
subgroup characteristics influence group performance (Carton and Cummings, 2012; Thatcher 
and Patel, 2012). Configurational properties, and particularly the size of the subgroups, are 
studied as potentially important drivers. So far, however, the theoretical arguments and 
empirical results are inconclusive. Some scholars argue that an imbalanced configuration, in 
which subgroups are unequally sized, has a positive effect on group performance. The 
argument put forward here is that the existence of a majority provides certainty (Menon and 
Phillips, 2011) and makes conflict less overt, resulting in smoother group dynamics, which in 
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turn positively influences performance (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Other scholars (O'Leary 
and Mortensen, 2010) find support for the opposite argument: a more balanced configuration 
positively influences group performance. As they argue, when there is no majority, different 
subgroup perspectives are equally taken into consideration, resulting in better decisions, 
which in turn positively influences group performance. Carton and Cummings (2013) add to 
this stream of literature by arguing that, in order to gain a better understanding of the 
influence of subgroup imbalance (i.e. the extent to which one subgroup is larger than the 
other) on group performance, the subgroup type also has to be considered. Particularly 
interesting is that, similar to our study, they study identity-based subgroups, formed by 
members sharing the same social category characteristics (Carton and Cummings, 2013). 
Subsequently, when identity-based subgroups arise, subgroup balance negatively influences 
group performance, which can be attributed to the fact that the overall group gets locked in 
conflicts related to values and beliefs (Carton and Cummings, 2013). Along the same lines, 
we can expect increasing levels of subgroup imbalance to weaken the negative effects of task 
conflict on group performance. Indeed, as the subgroups we study are identity-based, board 
task conflict will be particularly detrimental to board service performance if subgroups have 
similar sizes and no dominant subgroup can put its stamp on the discussion. In contrast, 
increasing subgroup imbalance will mitigate the negative effect of task conflict on board 
service performance, resulting in the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: The relationship between board task conflict and board service performance is positively 
moderated by subgroup imbalance. Specifically, higher levels of subgroup imbalance mitigate 
the negative relationship between board task conflict and board service performance. 
 
 
METHODS 
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Research setting 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 218) defined the field of entrepreneurship as “the 
scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future 
goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited.” Generally, entrepreneurship is 
about “the new” (in terms of goods, services, knowledge) and how it enters the economic 
system, as well as about change (Langlois, 2007). An entrepreneurial firm is then either a new 
firm or a firm somehow willing and able to reset its own memory (Langlois, 2007), and as 
such entrepreneurship includes, but is not limited to, the creation of new organizations (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). While the term “social entrepreneurship” has since been 
interpreted in many different ways (Dees, 1998), Mair and Marti (2006, p. 37) bring together 
the social and entrepreneurial aspects of the concept and define it as a process that involves 
“the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social 
change and/or address social needs.” As Mair and Marti (2006) point out, through the social 
contexts in which social entrepreneurship occur (newly created or established organizations), 
social enterprises can be distinguished from loosely structured initiatives that also aim at 
social change, such as activist movements.  
It is further clear that the conceptualization of social entrepreneurship is context-dependent 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Borzaga and Defourny (2001) and Kerlin (2006) indicate that, 
in Europe, social entrepreneurship is mainly confined to the realm of work integration and 
employment creating initiatives. Perrini (2006) indicates that social entrepreneurship in 
Europe is a non-for-profit response to welfare-related challenges, financial pressure put on 
social-purpose organizations and decreased donations to such organizations. As such, “Work 
Integration Social Enterprises” (hereafter: WISEs), which are the objects of our study, 
correspond to the definition of social entrepreneurship, while forming a general accepted type 
of social enterprises in a European context. The primary aim of WISEs is the socio-
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professional reintegration of disadvantaged people, such as disabled people and people with 
social or psychological problems, experiencing difficulties to integrate on the job market. 
WISEs hire these people to produce goods and services for the commercial market. In 
addition, WISEs invest actively in job training, necessary to make reintegration in the labor 
market possible, and provide social support to solve personal problems that are often 
obstacles for employment (Battilana et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Van Opstal et al., 
2009).  
We study WISEs in a specific part of Belgium, namely Flanders. We particularly focus on 
Flemish organizations for homogeneity reasons as Belgium has a federal structure and social 
economy policies are organized at the regional level. WISEs in Flanders are a good setting to 
test our theoretical framework for a number of reasons. First, as WISEs lack a dominant 
stakeholder, their boards of directors commonly consists of different stakeholder 
representatives (Kerlin, 2006; Spear et al., 2009). The principal stakeholders, namely the 
beneficiaries and customers, are typically represented on the board. As WISEs generally 
receive subsidies from the Flemish and local governments, (regional) government 
representatives frequently serve on WISEs’ boards, just like other funders, academics and 
volunteers. This is in line with the stakeholder groups identified by earlier social 
entrepreneurship studies (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010; Ramus and Vaccaro, 
2014). As such, the common practice of representation in the board of different stakeholder 
groups makes WISEs an interesting study context from a stakeholder representation 
perspective. Second, WISEs face unusual challenges, thus making the engagement of the 
board in its service role critical and the study of board service performance relevant. 
Specifically, WISEs must make important strategic decisions on resource allocation. For 
instance, while their primary social goals point to the allocation of resources to training and 
counseling of disadvantaged individuals, their commercial goals favor the allocation of 
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resources improving the quality of products and services at a competitive price (Battilana et 
al., 2015). Further, WISEs operate in highly competitive industries, such as packaging, 
assembly, gardening, recycling, and printing. Not only are they faced with competition from 
other WISEs, but also with competition from companies in low-wage countries, production in 
jails, and other commercial companies. Such challenges require the management and board to 
apply a risk taking attitude and to act entrepreneurially in the way they work with the 
beneficiaries as well as in the services and products they offer on the market (Van Opstal et 
al., 2009). As such, the board can contribute through engaging in service activities that 
enhance the WISEs’ reputation, strengthen the link with the external environment and 
optimally allocate resources within the organization.  
Sample and data collection 
Data were collected in 2014 from sheltered and social workshops, which are the dominant 
forms of WISEs in Flanders. In order to construct our sample, we contacted the federation of 
the sheltered workshops (VLAB) and the federation of the social workshops (SST), having 54 
and 94 member organizations, respectively. We asked for the name and email address of the 
CEO and also, if available, the name and contact details of the board chair. 
Our research goals required information from the WISEs, but also from the boards in these 
organizations. As such, in a first phase, we constructed a short questionnaire, which we 
distributed over e-mail (subsequently followed up by telephone) to 148 CEOs and 107 board 
chairs, in which we asked for names and contact information of all board members, as well as 
some biographical information on these members, and asked them to cooperate in our study. 
From the initial 148 organizations, 10 WISEs were dropped for technical reasons: mergers, 
acquisitions or because an enterprise had multiple identification codes despite being only one 
organization in reality. Ultimately 84 of the remaining 138 enterprises were willing to 
participate (61% response rate).  
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In a second stage, a questionnaire was distributed to the board members (including the board 
chairs) of the 84 WISEs willing to participate. In addition, a new questionnaire was sent to the 
CEOs of these organizations. In this questionnaire, we specifically asked questions about 
board characteristics and tasks alongside questions seeking background information on the 
organization and its board. The questionnaires were developed in English, translated into 
Dutch and back-translated to identify any possible confusion or errors that may have resulted 
from the translation. We pretested the questionnaires with four governance researchers and 
the directors of the two sectorial federations. Based on their feedback, we made some minor 
changes. A total of 788 surveys were distributed. After two rounds of reminders and a follow-
up by telephone, we received 345 completed surveys (79 CEOs and 266 board members) from 
80 different social enterprises. Because the reliance on the perceptions of a single respondent 
is a concern in studying board behavior and board dynamics (Huse et al., 2011; Minichilli et 
al., 2012), our goal was to receive at least two completed questionnaires from every 
organization.  For that reason, we had to exclude one organization for which only one board 
member participated in the survey. As a result, our analyses are based on 344 completed 
surveys (response rate 44%) from 79 organizations (response rate of 57%).  
 
Measures 
Dependent variable   
Board service performance. In line with Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Huse (2005), we 
consider the service role of the board as a combination of advice giving, strategic participation 
and networking. Based on the research of Minichilli et al. (2009), board service performance 
is measured using 10 items. The CEO and the board members were asked to indicate on a 
seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree) to what 
extent the board fulfills its service role. More specifically, we asked respondents to indicate 
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the degree to which the board (1) provides advice on management issues; (2) provides advice 
on financial issues; (3) provides advice on technical issues; (4) provides advice on market 
issues; (5) provides advice on legal issues; (6) provides linkages to important external 
stakeholders; (7) provides the firm with external legitimacy and reputation; (8) is involved in 
promoting strategic initiatives; (9) is involved in taking strategic decisions; and (10) is 
involved in participating in the implementation phase of long-term strategic decision-making. 
The Cronbach’s alpha of the ten items indicate strong scale reliability (0.91). In a next step, 
we assessed whether aggregating this variable was justified by calculating the eta-squared 
statistic η2. The eta-squared value for this statistic was 0.43 (p<0.001), which exceeded the 
minimum value of 0.20, demonstrating evidence of interrater consistency (Bezrukova et al., 
2009; Li and Hambrick, 2005). The individual answers were subsequently aggregated by 
calculating the mean of board service performance of the respondents belonging to the same 
organization. Values of board service performance range between 2.3 and 6.66, with an 
average value of 5.09. 
 
Independent, mediator and moderator variables 
Faultline Strength. To measure faultline strength, we used the faultline algorithm developed 
by Thatcher et al. (2003), which is one of the most widely used measures of faultline strength 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Calculating faultline strength (Fau) using this algorithm involves 
a two-step process. In a first step, the percentage variance explained by attribute alignment of 
two or more characteristics is measured for all possible splits of the group in two subgroups. 
The second step is to calculate the maximum value of Fau over all possible splits (Molleman, 
2005; Zanutto et al., 2011). Our measure of faultline strength is based on three social category 
based characteristics: stakeholder group represented, gender and age.  These data were 
collected in the first survey, answered by the CEO or the board chair. As our theoretical 
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rationale is based on stakeholder representation, we first consider which stakeholder group the 
different board members represent. In doing so, we based our categorization on the 
identification of represented stakeholder groups in prior social entrepreneurship research 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). As such, the first 
category we consider are (representatives of) beneficiaries, such as managers of nonprofit 
organizations in general and institutions taking care of people with disabilities or 
psychological problems in particular. The second category includes managers of for profit 
organizations representing market and customer interests. Third, government representatives 
frequently figure on the board, representing regional and local public policy as well as 
community interests. Finally, we added a fourth category, the “residual category,” consisting 
of people not belonging to the first three categories, such as academics, appointed to the board 
to support decision-making, and as such not representing a specific stakeholder group. In 
order for faultlines to emerge, the conceptualization of these different categories should align 
with other characteristics; as such we added two additional characteristics to calculate 
faultline strength in the board, namely gender and age. These are social category 
characteristics frequently used in faultline research as they are clearly visible characteristics, 
contributing to the emergence of faultlines based on similarity attraction and social identity 
(Bezrukova et al., 2009; Thatcher and Patel, 2012). In measuring age, three categories are 
considered (≤ 40, 41-60, >60). As to what gender is concerned, we distinguish between men 
and women.  We subsequently calculated Fau using the statistical program R and the 
asw.cluster package developed by Meyer and Glenz (2013). In our sample, Fau has a value 
between 0 and 1, with an average value of 0.5. A Fau value of 1 points to the existence of 
very strong faultlines, whereas a value close to 0 points to very weak faultlines between 
subgroups.  
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Board Task conflict. Board task conflict is measured using 6 items based on Jehn (1994) and 
Jehn (1995) that are frequently used (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009; Zona 
and Zattoni, 2007). Specifically, the respondents were asked to indicate on an seven-point 
Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), the degree to which they 
agreed with the following statements: On the board (1) there are frequently conflicts and 
disagreements on decisions to be taken; (2) there are frequently conflicts and disagreements 
on how the board should work; (3) there are frequently conflicts and disagreements on how to 
pursue the firm’s goal; (4) there are frequently disagreements on the firm’s legitimate 
stakeholders; (5) there is a great deal of disagreement on the decision process; and (6) there 
are major differences of opinion about executing the strategy.  
The board task conflict measure is then the average of 6 items (α = 0.91), aggregated by 
taking the mean for the respondents belonging to the same organization (η2 = 0.39, p < 0.001). 
Values for board task conflict range between 1 and 2.94, with an average value of 1.70. 
Shared organizational goals. The level of shared organizational goals was assessed using the 
scale of Leana and Pil (2006), adapted to a board context by Fredette and Bradshaw (2012). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with six statements using 
a seven-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree; 7: strongly agree). The six items are the 
following: (1) Board members share the same ambitions and vision for the organization;  (2) 
Board members are enthusiastic about pursuing the collective goals and mission of the 
organization; (3) There is a commonality of purpose in the board of my organization; (4) 
Board members are committed to the goals of the organization; (5) Board members view 
themselves as partners in charting the overall direction of the organization; and (6) On the 
board, everyone is in total agreement on our organization’s vision. Responses to the items 
were aggregated among members of the same organization (α = 0.94; η2 = 0.45, p < 0.001). 
The variable’s value ranges between 3 and 6.89, with an average of 5.89. 
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Subgroup imbalance. As noted earlier, the Fau algorithm calculates for which split into two 
subgroups the value of faultline strength is maximized. As such, through the calculation of 
Fau, we also gained insight into the size of subgroups. We subsequently calculated subgroup 
imbalance by dividing the size of the largest board subgroup by total board size (in terms of 
board members). Thus, a value of 0.5 indicates that both subgroups have the same size, which 
can be considered as a perfect subgroup balance. A value closer to 1 indicates that the 
subgroups are increasingly unequally sized, resulting in increasing subgroup imbalance. The 
average value for subgroup balance in our sample is 0.66. 
 
Control variables 
We further added control variables at board and firm level that may affect board service 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). At the board level, we control 
for the frequency of board meetings, as research finds that the frequency of board meetings 
impacts board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013). Because each board 
member may bring different linkages and resources to the board, the number of board 
members is also expected to influence board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 
2013; Minichilli et al., 2009). The organizations in our sample on average hold about 6 board 
meetings per year, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 12 annual board meetings. Board 
size ranges from 3 to 20 board members, with an average board size of about 9 members. In 
line with prior faultline research, we further control for diversity effects in the board (Lau and 
Murnighan, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005). We used Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index to 
measure board diversity in terms of stakeholder representation, age and gender. Following the 
procedure suggested by Jehn et al. (1999), we averaged the heterogeneity indices for these 
three indicators to construct the board heterogeneity control variable (Bezrukova et al., 2009; 
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Bezrukova et al., 2012; Veltrop et al., 2015). In our sample, board heterogeneity ranges from 
0 to 0.57, with an average value of 0.39. 
At the organizational level, we controlled for age and size of the social enterprise as the need 
for advice and establishing legitimacy by board members may vary between younger and 
older organizations and between smaller and larger organizations (Knockaert et al., 2015; 
Minichilli et al., 2012). The size of the organization is operationalized as the number of 
employees at the end of 2013, obtained from the public annual accounting database, Belfirst. 
The organizations in our sample are between 11 and 54 years old, with an average age of 25. 
The number of employees ranges from 12 to 585 with an average of 142 employees.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table I provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
To test our model as depicted in Figure 1, we employed a regression-based path analysis 
hereby building on existing computational tools. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranged 
between 1.157 and 2.679, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our analyses 
(Hair et al., 2006). We used the PROCESS macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (2013), 
which allows for testing for the total effect of faultline strength on board service performance 
(hypothesis 1), as well as for the mediation effect through board task conflict (hypothesis 2) 
(Hayes and Scharkow, 2013). Furthermore, we used this macro to test for the moderating 
effects of shared organizational goals (hypothesis 3) and subgroup imbalance (hypothesis 4). 
The model in path diagram can be found in Figure 2 and consists of three distinct submodels. 
Model 1, in Panel A, is used to test whether faultline strength has an effect on board service 
performance (hypothesis 1). Models 2 and 3, in Panel B, are used to estimate the indirect 
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effect of faultline strength on board service performance through board task conflict 
(hypothesis 2). Models 4 and 5 in panel C are used to test hypothesis 3 and 4. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table II. First, the control model only contains the 
control variables. The results show that the frequency of board meetings has a significantly 
positive effect on board service performance (B = 0.860, p < 0.001). Model 1 then allows us 
to estimate the total effect (c in Panel A of Figure 2) of faultline strength on board service 
performance. We find a significant, negative effect (B = -1.360, p < 0.01), supporting 
hypothesis 1. In Model 2 and Model 3, this total effect is decomposed in a direct (c’ in Panel 
B of Figure 2) and an indirect effect (a en b in Panel B of Figure 2). We find a significant, 
negative direct effect of faultline strength on board service performance (B = -1.006, p < 
0.05). Furthermore, the results show a significantly positive effect of faultline strength on 
board task conflict (B = 0.727, p < 0.05) and a significant negative effect of board task 
conflict on board service performance (B = -0.487, p < 0.01). A 95% confidence interval for 
this indirect effect, based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was found to range between -0.920 
and -0.069. As zero is not included in the interval, board task conflict can be construed as a 
mediator between faultline strength and board service performance, in the expected directions, 
thus supporting hypotheses 2a and 2b. Next, in model 4, the moderation effect of shared 
organizational goals is tested (d in Panel C of Figure 2). We find a significant, negative effect 
(B = -1.577, p < 0.01), indicating that higher levels of shared organizational goals attenuate 
the positive effect of faultline strength on board task conflict, resulting in lower levels of 
board task conflict. As such we find support for hypothesis 3. Finally in model 5, we test 
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whether the effect of board task conflict on board service performance is moderated by 
subgroup imbalance (e in Panel C of Figure 2). Hypothesis 4 is not supported as we find a 
moderating effect that is not statistically significant.  
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
  
In order to interpret the significant interaction between faultline strength and shared 
organizational goals in explaining board task conflict, we visualized the interaction in Figure 
3. The figure demonstrates that the slope of faultline strength is steeper for organizations with 
lower levels of shared organizational goals. Furthermore, the effect of faultline strength on 
board task conflict is neutralized for organizations with high levels of shared organizational 
goals, emphasizing the importance of having a shared vision on what the goals of the 
organization are within the board. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Stakeholder democracy in general, and stakeholder representation in the board of directors 
specifically, can help organizations to deal with the growing attention to sustainability and 
corporate citizenship. Through the involvement of stakeholders in the board, it is expected 
that organizations will be better able to balance diverging stakeholder expectations and, 
consequently, gain legitimacy from different stakeholder groups, which might be important 
for resource acquisition. Despite these advantages of stakeholder representation, several 
authors also warn for the potentially negative effects of such representation. In this study, we 
argue that stakeholder representation may give rise to the origination of subgroups and related 
faultlines. Particularly, we find that faultline strength is positively associated with lower 
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levels of board service performance and that this relationship is mediated by board task 
conflict. As such, our results show the importance of considering, alongside the presumed 
positive implications of the representation of stakeholder groups in the board, the potentially 
dark side of such stakeholder representation. However, our research also points to the 
existence of important contingencies that may mitigate such reverse effects. In particular, we 
find that, as board members’ visions on firm’s organizational goals increasingly converge, the 
negative impact of faultline strength on conflict within the board is mitigated. While not 
explicitly the focus of this study, we contend that the board chair, often considered a 
mediating hierarch in resolving decision-making ambiguities (Knockaert et al., 2015), may 
have an important role to play in enhancing convergence of board members’ visions on the 
organizational goals. Further, while we expected subgroup imbalance to alleviate the negative 
relationship between task conflict within the board and board service performance, we did not 
find support for such relationship. While our expectations were warranted following conflict 
theory, developments in the organizational behavior and entrepreneurship literatures may 
provide indications to explanations for the lack of support. Specifically, researchers point to 
the fact that individual and group behavior may not only be driven by objectives states, but 
may also be related to the perception of such states. For instance, in studies on diversity, 
scholars argue that it is not only the actual degree of diversity that affects behavior, but that 
the perceived dissimilarity between group members may also matter (Cunningham, 2007; 
Knockaert et al., 2015). Similarly, subgroup imbalance may only impact behavior if such 
imbalance is also perceived by the other group members (Cronin et al., 2011; O'Leary and 
Mortensen, 2010). Alternatively, subgroup imbalance may only alleviate the negative 
consequences of board task conflict in cases where such imbalance also leads to differences in 
the power distribution between subgroups. 
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Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the 
literature on stakeholder democracy and stakeholder participation, which has largely 
considered stakeholder representation in the board a good practice (Harrison and Freeman, 
2004; Moriarty, 2014), but neglects to study the phenomenon in general. Specifically, it points 
to the potentially nefarious implications of such representation, alongside the identification of 
contingency factors that may alleviate such implications. Second, our study adds to the 
corporate governance literature, which calls for an increased interest in the board service role, 
alongside (behavioral) theoretical perspectives that help to understand the board’s 
engagement in this role. Indeed, our approach is a clear shift away from the agency 
perspective that has dominated governance research for decades (Daily et al., 2003; 
McDonald and Westphal, 2010). Our results point to the importance of faultlines and conflict, 
and their underpinning theories, in studying board functioning. As such, it also responds to 
calls to leave the beaten paths of board structure and composition in order to provide deeper 
insights into board dynamics (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2007). Finally, our study 
contributes to faultlines literature, elaborating on the concept in a board context, in which it 
has been understudied. Specifically, it supports Lim et al. (2013)’s call to push the boundaries 
of the faultlines concept by not only considering multiple demographic attributes. 
Specifically, it introduces stakeholder representation as an important identity-based attribute. 
As such, it also responds to calls in the entrepreneurship literature to integrate the promising 
concept of faultlines in entrepreneurial settings (Lim et al., 2013). 
Our study also has implications for practitioners as our results reveal the potentially negative 
effects of stakeholder representation. Managers of organizations, just like their stakeholders 
and board members, should be aware of the potential drawbacks of representation of 
stakeholder groups in the board. While this should not be misinterpreted as a call to compose 
uniform boards in terms of stakeholder representation and other demographic characteristics, 
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this research indicates that it is important to be aware of the potentially negative effects of 
faultlines and subgroup formation. At the same time, our study points to the importance of 
contingency factors, such as alignment between board members as to what the organizational 
goals are, in alleviating the negative consequences of strong faultline emergence. Practitioners 
who follow good ethical practices by incorporating a range of stakeholders in the board of 
directors may want to take such contingencies into consideration. 
Our paper also has some limitations, which have implications for future research. First, in line 
with the majority of governance research, our study is based on a cross-sectional design, and 
is as such unable to identify causal relationships. Longitudinal studies may provide additional 
insights into causal relationships between subgroup and faultline emergence, the efforts made 
to attenuate the negative effects of faultlines, and board performance (Machold and Farquhar, 
2013). Additionally, qualitative research designs could be employed in order to study “how” 
and “why” questions, thus further opening up the black box of board dynamics in order to 
shed light on the processes through which different types of conflicts and actions for 
mitigating the drawbacks from strong faultlines work (McNulty et al., 2013). Such alternative 
research designs could include, among others, observation of board meetings and focus 
groups (Beck, 2014; Bezemer et al., 2014; Hough et al., 2014; Van der Brempt et al., 2015). 
Second, as articulated above, future research could study the impact of subgroup imbalance in 
alleviating the negative consequences of board task conflict on board performance. For 
instance, future research could simultaneously examine actual and perceived subgroup 
imbalance. It has to be noted that, in order to do so, ideally, two-staged research designs will 
have to be developed, in which the researcher first collects data in order to calculate faultline 
existence and strength. In a second phase, the researcher will then have to confront group 
members with the identified subgroups, and ask group members to indicate the extent to 
which imbalance between such subgroups is also perceived. Or, future research may revert to 
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experimental designs to shed further light on the relationship between actual and perceived 
subgroup imbalance. Alternatively, future research could study the relationship between 
subgroup imbalance and different dimensions of power (Triana et al., 2014) and how these 
dimensions could alleviate or strengthen the nefarious implications of strong faultlines. 
Finally, as our results show that it is important to build a shared vision of what the goals of 
the organization are, future research could provide insight into the antecedents of convergence 
in shared organizational goals. Specifically, board development practices, such as team 
building and board evaluations, may contribute to such a shared vision (Gill et al., 2005; Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2005) and may be fruitful research areas. Further, in line with board 
leadership research, board chairs may also facilitate a consensus on what the organizational 
goals are (Harrison et al., 2013) and future research could purposefully investigate under 
which circumstances (such as communication style, types and intensity of interactions, 
leadership style…) board chairs are successful in building such consensus.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this study is the first to study how faultlines originating from the representation 
of different stakeholder groups are related to board functioning. We conducted this study in 
the especially relevant context of social enterprises. Specifically, it points to the existence of a 
negative relationship between faultline strength and board service performance, which is 
mediated by board task conflict. Furthermore, the association between faultline strength and 
board task conflict was attenuated by a convergence between board members over 
organizational goals. Our study points to important implications for both academia and 
practice. 
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
45 
 
FIGURE 2 
Conceptual Model (Figure 1) represented as a path model, referring to the regression 
coefficients estimated and reported in Table 2 
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TABLE 1 
Mean, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
 Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Frequency of Board Meetings 6.34 2.45 1          
2. Board Size 8.81 3.61 -0.14 1         
3. Firm Age 25.42 12.93 0,19† 0.21† 1        
4. Firm Size  141.78 148.98 0.32** 0.16 0.67*** 1       
5. Board heterogeneity 0.39 0.12 0.06 0.25* 0.07 0.13 1      
6. Faultline Strength 0.50 .17 0.10 -0.21† -0.09 -0.02 -0.28* 1     
7. Board Task Conflict 1.70 0.50 -0.22† 0.20† -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 0.21† 1    
8. Board Service Performance 5.09 0.78 0.42*** -0.26* -0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.46*** 1   
9. Shared Organizational Goals 5.89 0.68 0.48*** -0.30** 0.10 0.23* -0.14 0.03 -0.61*** 0.72*** 1  
10. Subgroup Imbalance 0.66 0.12 0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.40*** -0.18 0.01 0.27* 0.19† 1 
Note. 
†p <.10,  *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
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TABLE II 
Regression models with the process macro (Hayes, 2013) 
 Control model 
Board Service 
Performance 
Model 1 
Board Service 
Performance 
Model 2 
Board Task 
Conflict  
Model 3 
Board Service 
Performance 
Model 4 
Board Task 
Conflict 
Model 5 
Board Service 
Performance 
Intercept 4.488*** 
(0.727) 
5.542*** 
(0.779) 
1.824** 
(0.537) 
6.430*** 
(0.796) 
-0.464 
(1.946) 
2.659 
(2.185) 
Frequency of Board Meetings 0.860*** 
(0.214) 
0.911*** 
(0.204) 
-0.247† 
(0.141) 
0.791*** 
(0.198) 
0.073 
(0.127) 
0.799*** 
(0.200) 
Board Size -0.398† 
(0.228) 
-0.497* 
(0.219) 
0.387* 
(0.151) 
-0.308 
(0.217) 
0.227† 
(0.126) 
-0.240 
(0.217) 
Firm Age 0.026 
(0.249) 
-0.071 
(0.240) 
-0.118 
(0.165) 
-0.128 
(0.228) 
-0.092 
(0.132) 
-0.145 
(0.228) 
Firm Size -0.029 
(0.128) 
0.020 
(0.123) 
-0.057 
(0.085) 
-0.008 
(0.117) 
-0.000 
(0.068) 
0.002 
(0.118) 
Board heterogeneity -0.093  
(0.697) 
-0.551 
(0.682) 
-0.606 
(0.470) 
-0.846 
(0.654) 
-0.441 
(0.414) 
-0.113 
(0.735) 
Faultline Strength  
 
-1.360** 
(0.462) 
0.727* 
(0.319) 
-1.006* 
(0.454) 
10.381** 
(3.688) 
-0.399 
(0.532) 
Board Task Conflict    -0.487** 
(0.162) 
 0.871 
(0.995) 
Shared Organizational goals     0.252 
(0.281) 
 
Faultline Strength x Shared Organizational goals     -1.577** 
(0.586) 
 
Subgroup Imbalance      4.675† 
(2.606) 
Board Task Conflict x Subgroup Imbalance      -2.098 
(1.499) 
F-value 5.011** 6.056*** 3.288** 7.057*** 9.815*** 6.207*** 
Adjusted R² 0.205 0.280 0.150 0.352 0.475 0.375 
R² 0.256 0.335 0.215 0.410 0.529 0.447 
S.E. values are reported in parentheses. 
†p <.10,  *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001. 
 
c a c' 
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d 
e 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
48 
 
FIGURE 3 
Interaction effect of faultline strength and shared organizational goals in relation with 
board task conflict 
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